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Diomampo v. State of Nevada, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 41 (June 12, 2008)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a judgment of conviction, upon jury verdict, of one count of mid-
level trafficking in a controlled substance.  
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Reversed and remanded holding that the State’s peremptory challenge of a 
prospective juror on the ground that he did not understand the English language was 
improper and the State introduced improper evidence at trial.   
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
On May 19, 2004, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department officers Wojcik 
and Garbon effected a routine traffic stop of a car driven by Jose Noel Diomampo 
(“Diomampo”). Diomampo was driving on a suspended license and had outstanding 
warrants for his arrest.  Officer Wojcik placed Diomampo under arrest.  A routine search 
of the vehicle revealed an electronic scale that contained a “white, crystalline-type 
substance.”  The same substance was also found in Diomampo’s sunglass case.  This 
substance was later determined to be methamphetamine. Additional drug paraphernalia 
was also found in the vehicle.  Officer Wojcik read Diomampo Miranda and Diomampo 
invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. 
 
At trial, the State used all four of its peremptory challenges on minorities.  
Additionally, Officer Wojcik, the State’s witness, testified that Diomampo remained 
silent after being read his Miranda rights.  The defense’s objection was overruled.  
Additionally, Officer Wojcik testified that “with methamphetamine[,] normally in order 
for somebody to support their habit[,] they’ll go out and commit robberies or burglaries.”  
The jury convicted Diomampo of mid-level trafficking in a controlled substance. 
Diomampo appealed and raised the following issues. 
 
Discussion 
 
The State’s Improper Peremptory Challenges 
  
 During jury selection, the State used all four of its peremptory challenges to 
dismiss four minorities. Diomampo claimed that the state violated Baston v. Kentucky.2 
   
                                                 
1 By Tyler James Watson  
2 476 U.S. 79 (1986).   
 In Baston, the United States Supreme Court held that the use of peremptory 
challenges to remove potential jurors on the basis of race is unconstitutional under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.3  The Court has outlined a 
three-pronged test for determining whether illegal discrimination has occurred: (1) the 
defendant must make a prima facie showing that discrimination based on race has 
occurred based upon the totality of the circumstances, (2) the prosecution then must 
provide a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory challenge or challenges, and (3) the 
district court must determine whether the defendant in fact demonstrated purposeful 
discrimination.4 
 
 Here, the Court held that two of the four dismissed jurors were improperly 
dismissed.  First, prospective juror Ramirez was improperly dismissed because the record 
did not support the State’s race-neutral reason: that Ramirez had difficulties 
understanding English.  Second, prospective juror Nelson was improperly dismissed 
because the record did not support the State’s race-neutral reason: that Nelson was 
preoccupied with his divorce.  However, the Court found that the other two dismissed 
jurors were properly dismissed under Batson.  The Court concluded that the two Batson 
violations identified required reversal and remand for a new trial as a matter of law. 
 
Post-Miranda Silence 
 
 Diomampo argues that Officer Wojcik commented on his post-Miranda silence in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.5 The Court 
recently held in Gaxiola v. State that “the prosecution is forbidden at trial to comment 
upon an accused’s election to remain silent following his arrest and after he has been 
advised of his rights.”6  However, a “mere passing reference” to post-Miranda silence 
“without more, does not mandate an automatic reversal.”7 
 
 At trial, the prosecutor asked two questions of Officer Wojcik regarding 
Dipmampo’s silence.  The Court concluded that, when considered in the context of the 
full record generated at trial, the State’s questions and comments at trial regarding 
Diomampo’s post-Miranda silence were more than “mere passing reference”8 and were 
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 
 Here, the Court concluded that the jury could have drawn improper conclusions 
about Diomampo’s silence based on the prosecutor’s questions and the officer’s answer 
and the failure of the district court to strike the testimony from the record or provide a 
limiting instruction to the jury.  Therefore, the Court held that the judgment of conviction 
must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
 
                                                 
3 Id. at 86. 
4 Id. at 96-98. 
5 Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 655 (2005). 
6 Id. 
7 Shepp v. State, 87 Nev. 179, 181 (1971). 
8 Id. 
Evidence of Prior Bad Acts 
 
 The Court held that the State improperly introduced an instance of “prior bad 
acts” in violation of NRS 48.045(2) through Officer Wojcik’s comment about 
methamphetamine users criminal propensities. NRS 48.045(2) provides that “[e]vidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.”  Under Petrocelli v. State,9 in order 
to admit evidence of prior bad acts, the district court must conduct a hearing outside the 
presence of the jury and determine “that: (1) the incident is relevant to the crime charged; 
(2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the probative value of the 
evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”10 
 
 The Court held that admitting Officer Wojcik’s testimony that methamphetamine 
users normally support their habits by committing robberies affected Diomampo’s 
substantial rights because it permitted the jury to draw inferences about Diomampo’s 
character and his conforming propensity to commit other crimes.  Accordingly, the Court 
held that the district court erred in admitting the portion of Officer Wojcik’s testimony 
that related to the practices of methamphetamine users. 
 
Warrantless Vehicle Search and Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
 The Court dismissed Diomampo’s remaining arguments.  The Court held that the 
officer’s had sufficient justification under the Fourth Amendment to conduct a 
warrantless search of the vehicle, incident to arrest, for weapons or to inventory its 
contents.  Additionally, the Court held that Diomampo’s argument that the prosecution 
failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction was without merit. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court held that the violation of Baston compelled reversal of the judgment of 
conviction in this matter.  Furthermore, the Court held that it could not conclude that the 
comments on Diomampo’s post-Miranda silence were harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Finally, the improper admission of character evidence also mandated reversal.  
Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the matter for 
a new trial.  
                                                 
9 101 Nev. 46 (1985). 
10 Tinch v. State, 113 Nev. 1170, 1176 (1997).   
